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Abstract
We integrate an epidemiological model, augmented with contact and mobility analyses,
with a two-sector macroeconomic model, to assess the economic costs of labor supply
disruptions in a pandemic. The model is designed to capture key characteristics of the
U.S. Input-Output Tables with a core sector that produces intermediate inputs not easily
replaceable by the other sectors, possibly subject to minimum-scale requirements. Using
epidemiological and mobility data to inform our exercises, we show that the reduction in
labor services due to the observed social distancing (spontaneous and mandatory) could
explain up to 6-8 percentage points of the roughly 12 percent U.S. GDP contraction in the
second quarter of 2020. We show that public measures designed to protect workers in core
industries and occupations with tasks that cannot be performed from home, can flatten
the epidemiological curve at reduced economic costs—and contain vulnerabilities to supply
disruptions vis-à-vis a new surge of infections. Using state-level data for the United States,
we provide econometric evidence that spontaneous social distancing was no less costly than
mandated social distancing.
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1 Introduction
By the end of March 2020, nearly four months after the first detection of significant
coronavirus infections in China, most advanced economies adopted measures restrict-
ing people’s movements and activity on their territory, introduced tough controls at
their borders, and mandated norms implementing social distancing. If only with
some delay, governments converged on the idea that restrictions were required to
reduce the human cost of the disease. The decision to adopt mandated restrictions
was strongly influenced by early scenario analyses stressing that an uncontrolled and
rapid spread of the disease would have overwhelmed national health systems and
caused a sharp rise in mortality rates.1 At the same time, mobility fell precipitously,
although not uniformly across locations, as individuals took precautions. During the
subsequent months, contagion and death rates, while high, turned out to be much
lower than indicated by these early scenario analyses, as social distancing, whether
mandated or spontaneous, became widespread practice. At the end of 2020, a new
surge associated with more infectious variants of the virus motivated once again the
widespread adoption of strict lockdown policies.
Our analysis contributes to the literature on the policy trade-offs raised by a
pandemic, with an assessment of the extent to which a large upfront reduction in
the supply of labor services caused by the disease and social distancing can weigh
on economic activity. Specifically, working in real time in the early months of 2020,
we were concerned that labor shortages could have hit industries and parts of the
economy that, directly and indirectly, provide essential inputs to production and/or
are essential for the economy to run. While it may be difficult to identify precisely
which specific industries and activities produce essential inputs and services and
hence should be included in the core sector, there are some reasonable choices: dis-
tribution services, transportation, sanitation, energy supply, health care services, and
food.2 Labor shortages that hobble industries in this “core sector” can amplify the
1 Among the leading papers that formalized this view early on, see Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020),
Jones, Philippon, and Venkateswaran (2020) and Alvarez, Argente, and Lippi (2020). The literature on the
economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic has grown very fast, see Atkeson (2020), Alfaro et al. (2020), Baker
et al. (2020), Guerrieri et al. (2020), and Koren and Petó (2020) among many others.
2 For an analysis of production structures and core sectors, see Carvalho (2014) and Carvalho and Tah-
baz-Salehi (2018). Barrot, Grassi, and Sauvagnat (2020) offers a sectoral analysis of the effect of the COVID-19
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impact economic contraction of a pandemic. First, the services and goods produced
by the core sector are not easily substitutable and, second, the production processes
in many industries in this sector may be subject to a minimum-scale requirement
for labor—i.e., they require a sufficient number of specialized and not easily substi-
tutable employees to show up for work. This amplification mechanisms may not be
apparent during normal business cycle fluctuations, but can be expected to become
relevant with the scale and timing of a pandemic shock.
We develop a stylized “integrated assessment model for infectious diseases,” which
combines a deterministic multi-group epidemiological model with a two-sector eco-
nomic growth model.3 Using this framework, we can map both the incapacitating
effects of the disease on workers and the intensity of social distancing, proxied by
mobility data, into the spread of the disease and the number of people able to work
as well as the associated contraction in economic activity.
Our main contributions are as follows. First, prior to our quantitative exercises,
we motivate our use of mobility data in the model calibration by providing economet-
ric evidence on the epidemiological and economic effects of social distancing. Based
on U.S. state-level data for 2020, we find that the reduction in mobility lowered the
reproduction rate (defined below) with an elasticity from 3 to 5, and raised initial
jobless claims with an elasticity around 0.15. We derive our regression tests from
the standard epidemiological SIRD model, proxying contacts using Google mobility
data, and instrumenting mobility with either the stay-at-home orders issued by indi-
vidual U.S. states, or political leanings by state. Strikingly, even though most of the
decrease in mobility at the onset of the pandemic was driven by spontaneous social
distancing, it was no less costly than stay-at-home orders.
Second, using epidemiological, mobility, and occupational data, we show that the
reduction in labor services due to the observed social distancing (spontaneous or
mandatory) can explain up to 8 percentage points of the 12 percent output collapse
pandemic.
3 We borrow the term “integrated assessment model” from the literature on climate change to emphasize the
importance of linking economics to phenomena that are relevant for the well-being of humankind but that are
outside the traditional focus of the economics profession. As in the case of climate change policies, public health
policies may have consequences for economic activity that can influence the choices of policymakers.
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experienced by the United States in 2020.4 Under our working hypotheses on the
industry composition and production function in the core sector, almost 2 out of the
8 percentage points of contraction could be attributed to impaired activity in this
sector.
To be clear, we are not claiming that supply disruptions were the only mechanism
by which the pandemic translated into a sudden large drop in activity in 2020—if
anything, our exercise led us to conclude that these disruptions were not as biting
as we initially feared. The precipitous fall in demand in early 2020 stemmed from
a combination of factors, including: the sudden stop in the consumption of services
exposing people to contagion risk (from hospitality to travel and entertainment), the
spike in precautionary saving/drop in investment due to the large uncertainty on
the medium and long-run effects of the pandemic, and lockdowns and precautionary
suspensions of services such non-emergency health care.5 To put it simply, in the
context of a low demand and mandatory restrictions, possible problems in the supply
of, say, public transportation or health services may have not emerged in the open.
Yet, we believe it would be wrong to conclude that supply disruptions played no role
at the outset of the COVID-19 shock, or that a pandemic would at no time raise
issues on the supply side.
A benefit of our focus on the supply side is transparent guidance in the design
of social distancing measures. Specifically, our model underscores the benefits of
public measures aiming to protect workers in core industries and occupations with
tasks that cannot be performed from home. We show that, in a spike of contagion,
such measures can flatten the epidemiological curve at reduced economic costs. We
argue that, looking at the future, this strategy could contain vulnerabilities to sup-
ply disruptions vis-à-vis a new surge of infections—as well as in structuring health
measures to accompany the administration of a vaccine.6
For the purpose of our analysis, the epidemiological block of our framework
4 We calculated this decline relative to the consensus level of GDP in the Blue Chip forecasts published in
January 2020, before private forecasters entertained the possibility of a pandemic.
5 Jordà, Singh, and Taylor (2020) provide estimates on how pandemics are different from other destructive
episodes, such as wars, based on a dataset stretching back to the 14th century. For pandemics, they point to
changes in consumption that they attribute to heightened precautionary behavior.
6 See, e.g., Correia, Luck, and Verner (2020) for empirical evidence and an account of the beneficial effects of
health policies for the case of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic.
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includes an extension of the standard susceptible-infective-removed-death (SIRD)
model with a homogeneous population to a setting with multiple groups, accounting
for the heterogeneous roles that individuals play in the economic production process
and accounting for different age groups.7 This setup gives us the flexibility to dif-
ferentiate lockdowns across groups by sector and occupational task. The economic
block of our framework, in turn, assumes a low degree of substitutability between
core and non-core inputs in producing final output goods, as well as a realistically low
degree of worker mobility across sectors (i.e., we set intersectoral mobility to zero).
The minimum-scale requirement in the core sector captures the idea that technology
in the industries in this sector is such that workers need to operate as members of a
team, reflecting the difficulty of replacing team members with specialized skills. By
way of example, surgery operations cannot be perform without a complete team of
doctors, nurses and technicians; the subway system cannot run if not enough train
operators show up for work. A reduction in the number of workers could lead to in-
efficient work arrangements and/or outright shut-downs of production facilities—so
that labor supply and productivity fall in tandem. In addition, we allow for endoge-
nous capacity utilization, investment adjustment costs, and put a lower bound on
disinvestment, implying that accumulated capital cannot be consumed.
The two blocks of the model are tied together by the dynamic of the infection
(and death) rates, which influence the labor supply. In general, this dynamic is
driven by complex interactions of possibly time-varying features of the virus (e.g.,
mutations) and environmental conditions (e.g., seasonality), with social distancing
(spontaneous or mandatory) reducing contacts among people and also influencing the
labor supply, and the adoption of precautions conditional on contacts (e.g., masks
and hand washing). Because of these complex interactions, the fluctuations in the
infection and death rates throughout 2020—with the spread of the pandemic more
limited than foreshadowed by early pessimistic scenarios—are a challenge to inte-
grated epidemiological and economic models. We address this challenge by bringing
7 The origins of the SIRD model and other closely related models of mathematical epidemiology trace back
to the seminal contributions of Kermack and McKendrick (1927). Brauer, Driessche, and Wu (2008) offer an
introduction to state-of-the-art mathematical epidemiology with numerous models that are more detailed about
the dynamics of infectious diseases. However, most of these models feature the SIRD model (or its close cousin
the SIS model) at their core.
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our model to bear on the dynamic of the (estimated) reproduction rates, calibrating
it with mobility data as evidence on contact rates, and estimates of workers who can
supply their labor services from home.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews key data for the
United States and provides empirical evidence on the effects of social distancing.
Section 3 introduces the integrated model, specifying both the epidemiological and
the economic elements as well as the structure of social distancing. Section 4 discusses
our calibration and solution methods. Section 5 discusses our results on the effects
of varying the type and intensity of social distancing measures. Section 6 concludes.
Further details on the model and sensitivity analysis are presented in the appendix.
2 Setting the Stage: A Review of Epidemiological
Models and Evidence for the United States in 2020
In this section, we set the stage for our analysis by providing and discussing evidence
on the dynamic of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States in the first three
quarters of 2020, and the effects of social distancing on the spread of the disease and
unemployment across U.S. states. Throughout our analysis, we will make extensive
use of mobility data to approximate social distancing and trace its effect on the
economy. The evidence in this section is an important preliminary step motivating
our theoretical exercises below.
Section 2.1 describes a one-group SIRD model—capturing how a disease spreads
by direct person-to-person contact in a population. At this stage, we let individuals
differ only with regard to their health status—our baseline model in which individuals
differ also with regard to their socioeconomic characteristics will be introduced later.
Section 2.2 reviews stylized facts on the diffusion of the disease over time and across
states in the United States, including data on mobility and health measures adopted
at state level. Drawing on the SIRD model, Section 2.3 specifies a simple econometric
8 An alternative strategy would be to modify consumer preferences to model spontaneous social distancing
following the lead of, e.g., Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020). Our choice is not meant to downplay the
importance of investigating theoretically the roots of behavior driving the precautionary reduction in consumption
and labor. On the contrary, we see our analysis as strictly complementary to theirs.
6
framework and provides evidence on the effects of social distancing on the dynamic
of the pandemic and employment.
2.1 A Baseline One-Group SIRD Model
The one-group SIRD model in this section follows Fernández-Villaverde and Jones
(2020), as we later use their estimates in the validation of our integrated model.9
Time is discrete and measured in days. At every instant in time, the total population
N is divided into the classes of:
1. susceptible St consisting of individuals who can incur the disease but are not
yet infected;
2. infective It consisting of individuals who are infected and can transmit the
disease;
3. resolving Rt consisting of sick individuals who are no longer infective;
4. recovered (or, equivalently, cured) Ct consisting of individuals who have recov-
ered from the disease;
5. deceased Dt consisting of individuals who died from the disease.
This model differs from the standard SIRD model by distinguishing between the
infective and the resolving class. Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020) found this
distinction necessary to obtain a good model fit in their empirical application to U.S.
data.
An important assumption of standard SIRD models is that “law of mass action”
applies: The rate at which infective and susceptible individuals meet is proportional
to their spatial density StIt. The effective contact rate per period βt is the average
number of adequate contacts per infective period. An adequate contact of an infective
individual is an interaction that results in infection of the other individual if that
person is susceptible. Thus, βt can be expressed as the product of the average of all
contacts qt and the probability of infection (transmission risk) given contact between
an infective and a susceptible individual, µt.
9 Broader introductions to epidemiological modeling are given in Hethcote (1989), Allen (1994), and Brauer,
Driessche, and Wu (2008).
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It is important to note that the effective contact rate is not constant but can vary
over time for a number of reasons. First, an individual’s number of contacts, qt, can
drop in a pandemic because of mandated social restrictions (e.g., school closures,
closures of shops and restaurants, stay-at-home orders) or voluntary adjustments
of behavior (e.g., online shopping instead of in-person shopping, refraining from
attending larger gatherings). As both mandated and spontaneous contact restrictions
may take place simultaneously, it may be challenging to disentangle their effects on
βt. Nonetheless, restrictions have an impact on the economy regardless of whether
they are mandated or spontaneous in nature. Second, the probability of infection
given contact between an infectious and a susceptible individual µt can vary over
time. In the case of COVID-19, this probability is influenced both by human behavior
(e.g., masks, keeping sufficient physical distance) and by the characteristics of the
virus (e.g., transmission in closed versus open spaces, sensitivity to temperature and
seasonality, aggressiveness of the virus strains).
In detail, we write the discrete time SIRD model as:
St+1 = St − βtStIt/N, (1)
It+1 = It + βtStIt/N − γIt, (2)
Rt+1 = Rt + γIt − ϑRt, (3)
Ct+1 = Ct + (1−̟)ϑRt, (4)
Dt+1 = Dt +̟ϑRt, (5)
N = St + It +Rt + Ct +Dt, (6)
with the initial conditions S0 > 0 and I0 > 0. In addition, St ≥ 0, It ≥ 0, and
St + It ≤ 1. Total new infections at time t are given by βtStIt/N . Infections resolve
at the Poisson rate γ. A person in the resolving class (Rt) either recovers (Ct) with
probability 1−̟ or dies (Dt) with probability ̟. The recovery rate is denoted by
ϑ. In principle, the recovery rate and the death rate could also be time-varying to
reflect advancements in medical treatment as the pandemic progresses.
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2.2 The Dynamic of the COVID-19 Spread in the United
States
Conditional on a constant contact rate β, with an empirically relevant reproduction
rate equal to 2, a mainstream estimate for the onset of the pandemic, almost the
entire population is infected in a matter of months. According to leading scenarios
debated in March 2020, for instance, it could not be ruled out that between 15 and 20
percent of the U.S. population could have simultaneously developed symptoms, and
that, over a short time frame, 20 percent of these symptomatic individuals would
have required hospitalization.10 These developments would have put devastating
pressure on the health care system of any country.
Scenarios conditional on a constant β played a crucial role in motivating stark
health measures in many countries—for this reason, we will study this type of scenario
as a benchmark reference below. Remarkably, however, these grim developments did
not come to pass. Figure 1 superimposes data for the spread of COVID-19 in the
United States, death rates and confirmed cases, and data on the timing of stay-at-
home orders and changes in residential mobility—culled from cellphones, as captured
in Google’s mobility reports, and reflecting both trips towards residential addresses
and time spent at those addresses.11
Tracking the spread of COVID-19 is no easy feat. Even the best available data
are subject to important drawbacks. As Figure 1 shows, confirmed new cases surged
in March 2020, reached a first peak in early April, a second peak in mid-July and
climbed back up through the fall. Using confirmed new cases to measure the intensity
of the pandemic is challenging since severe rationing of testing at the beginning of
the pandemic kept the data artificially low. Data on death rates do not suffer from
that problem and confirm at least three cycles for the spread of the disease. However,
the relationship between the spread of the disease and death rates can also vary as
new treatment protocols are developed or the age composition of infected individuals
evolve, given that older individuals experience greater mortality rates. The middle
10 For instance, see Ferguson et al. (2020).
11 The data for death rates and confirmed cases are from JHU CSSE (2020), also see Dong, Du, and Gardner
(2020). The data on stay-at-home orders are from Raifman et al. (2020). The mobility data are from Google
LLC (2020).
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panel of the figure shows the reproduction rate for the model in Equations (1)-(6)
estimated by Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020) based on data on death rates.
The solid black line shows the overall estimate for the United States. Two cycles are
clearly visible in the estimates of the reproduction rate. The state-level estimates
show much greater variation, as indicated by the point-wise maximum and minimum
dashed red lines for these estimates.
Figure 1 also shows that stay-at-home orders were put in place at different points
in time across states, roughly within a three week window from mid-March to early
April.12 These orders had a median duration of six weeks, but the duration also
varied considerably by state. Twelve states did not impose stay-at-home orders.
In the states that did, the shortest orders lasted three weeks and the longest, for
California, was still standing in parts of the state at the time of writing.
The figure suggests that social distancing contributed significantly to slowing
down the spread of the disease. It also shows that mobility measures capturing time
spent at home ramped up even before the imposition of stay-at-home orders at the
regional level. We will take advantage of the timing of these events to gain some
insight on the relative role of spontaneous vs. mandated social distancing in driving
the evolution of the disease.
2.3 The Effects of Social Distancing
In this section we provide evidence that social distancing, be it spontaneous or
mandatory, has comparable epidemiological and economic effects. Specifically, based
on the epidemiological model, we derive and apply two empirical tests of the hypoth-
esis that contacts, as proxied by mobility data, have an effect on the reproduction
rate and the initial jobless claims. First, we will focus on changes in mobility in
response to stay-at-home orders, using a difference-in-difference approach. Then we
will investigate the dynamic evolution of contagion in the two-week period in March
that preceded any mandatory measure, based on cross-sectional evidence.
Several other papers have sized empirically the economic effects of mandated so-
cial distancing, including Allcott et al. (2020) and Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and
12 The earliest stay-at-home order started in California on March 19.
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Weber (2020). Our approach is closest to Gupta et al. (2020), who also use a
difference in difference approach to size the effects on the labor market. Our spe-
cific approach helps us distinguish between the direct effects of the social-distancing
policies through reduction in mobility and outcomes related to spontaneous social
distances predating the policies.13 Goolsbee and Syverson (2021) also rely on a dif-
ference in difference estimation method but use more capillary data at the local level.
Nonetheless, their results on the economic effects of mandated social distancing are
broadly in line with ours.
For both tests below, we derive our regression framework from the SIRD model
described in Section 2.1. In the SIRD framework, the status of the pandemic is





where the effective contact rate βt is the product of contacts qt, normalized to 1, and
the probability of transmission, µt. We can therefore express the reproduction rate
as
ln(R0,t) = − ln(γ) + ln(µt) + ln(qt − rt) (8)
where the term rt represents policy restrictions that can reduce the level of con-
tacts. We will use this equation to derive a panel regression and a cross-sectional
test.14 Atkeson, Kopecky, and Zha (2021) provide framework consistent with ours to
decompose the reproduction rate but allow for a feedback mechanism between the
reproduction and infection rates.
13 See Atkeson, Kopecky, and Zha (2021) for an extension of the canonical SIR model that incorporates spon-
taneous feedback from disease prevalence to disease transmission.
14 Alternative approaches to estimating the effects of mandated social distancing measures are offered by
Chernozhukov, Kasahara, and Schrimpf (2021) and Huang (2020). They focus on epidemiological effects, whereas
we are also interested in a comparison of the epidemiological benefits and of the economic consequences of
mandated and spontaneous social distancing.
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2.3.1 Mandated Social Distancing: A Panel Regression Approach
The relationship between the reproduction rate and contacts in Equation 8 can be
mapped into the following panel regression equation:
ln(R0,s,t) = FEm + bms,t + FEs + es,t. (9)
where the subscript s denotes the geographical region and the term R0,s,t is the re-
gional counterpart to the aggregate R0,t in Equation 8. The dependent variable in
our baseline, consistent with the model in Section 2.1, is the reproduction rate es-
timated by Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020). We average the daily estimates
by these authors to the weekly frequency and use readings for the 48 U.S. states in
their dataset and the District of Columbia.15 We use monthly fixed effects, FEm,
to capture the time-varying probability of transmission µt, which might depend on
taking precautions such as frequent hand-washing and mask-wearing that have be-
come more prevalent with the spread of the virus.16 We proxy contacts qt − rt
at the regional level with the term ms,t, the Google index for residential mobility
in percent deviation from its value at the beginning of 2020, also averaged to the
weekly frequency. The term FEs denotes regional-level fixed effects, which allow for
regional characteristics to influence the relationship between contacts and mobility.
Finally, es,t is a stochastic term in the relationship between contacts and mobility.
Our main interest is the regression coefficient b. An important restriction imposed
by our regression framework is that this coefficient does not vary across regions.
We estimate Equation 9 by two-stage least squares, using a dummy for the stay-
at-home orders as an instrument for residential mobility. To lessen endogeneity
concerns we lag the dummy for the stay-at-home orders by one week. At the first
stage, we also allow for monthly and regional fixed effects. The estimation sample
has starting points that vary by region, in line with regional variation in the spread
of the disease. The earliest estimates of the reproduction rate are for the state of
Washington, starting on March 12, 2020. By contrast, estimates of the reproduction
15 The dataset of Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020) excludes Wyoming and Montana.
16 The framework of Atkeson, Kopecky, and Zha (2021) captures these effects as a time-varying wedge.
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rate for Hawaii only start on August 7, 2020. The end point for the estimation
sample across all regions is September 28, 2020. Overall, the sample includes 1204
observations.
Our estimates of Equation 9, first and second stage, are shown in Table 1. In
the table, Column 1 indicates that, on average, stay-at-home orders push up the
mobility index 1.85 percent. Returning to the table, Column 2 shows that a 1
percent increase in residential mobility reduces the reproduction rate by about 3.5
percent, all else equal. Putting the two estimates in colmuns 1 and 2 together, on
average, the stay-at-home orders led to a decline in the reproduction rate of about
1.85 × 3.5 ≈ 6.5 percent. In other words, starting from a basic reproduction rate
of 2, the stay-a-home order would reduce it to about 1.9. One may note that, at
its peak, the index of residential mobility increased by about 20 percent (reflecting
an increase in time spent at home). Even if all states had enacted stay-at-home
orders, our estimates would attribute only 1.85 percentage points of this increase to
those orders. Accordingly the great majority of the 20 percent increase was linked
to spontaneous social distancing.
To gauge the effects of the stay-at-home orders on initial unemployment claims,
we use a regression framework analogous to that of Equation 9. We consider
U0,s,t+1 = FEm + bums,t + FEs + es,t+1, (10)
where the term U0,s,t represents initial jobless claims as a share of the working age
population in region s at time t. For the sake of comparison, we select an estimation
sample with exactly the same span of the sample for the regression of the reproduc-
tion rate. We also estimate Equation 10 by two-stage least squares, using a dummy
for the stay-at-home orders as an instrument for residential mobility. Once again,
using standard Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests, we fail to reject the null hypothesis
that the instrument is exogenous. This time, probability values for the tests are of
0.13 and 0.14, respectively. Connecting the estimates in columns (1) and (3) of Table
1, the regression results point to an increase in the unemployment rate of roughly 0.3
(1.85 × 0.153 ≈ 0.3) percentage point for every week that the stay-at-home orders
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were in force. With a median duration of 6 weeks and the orders applying to much
of the country, they could have accounted for an increase in the unemployment rate
of about 2 percentage points.
2.3.2 Spontaneous Social Distancing: A Cross-Sectional Approach
To study the effect of spontaneous social distancing, we consider a two-week period
before the imposition of any stay-at-home order—the 14-day period through March
17, which is two days before the first stay-at-home order went into effect in California.
The evidence reviewed above suggests that much of the reduction in mobility had
already occurred by the time mandatory rules started to be imposed. Yet, this initial
mobility reduction was far from homogeneous across states.
A useful observation for our purpose is by Gollwitzer et al. (2020), who note that
individual political leanings influence social distancing practices, and through these
practices also influence health outcomes. We design a second test of our hypothesis
building on this observation. Namely, we instrument mobility with political leanings
by U.S. state, as captured in the share of the vote for the Republican candidate in
the 2016 presidential election. Given our focus on the first part of March, before the
introduction of mandatory measures, we collapse the time dimension of our initial
panel regression and rely only on the cross-sectional variation at the state level.
Starting from the regression framework in Equation 9, we now difference the spec-
ification between two points in time on the same month. Focusing on the regression
for reproduction rate, this differencing yields
ln(R0,t,s)− ln(R0,t−h,s) = b(ms,t −ms,t−h) + es,t − es,t−h. (11)
(We proceed analogously for initial jobless claims using equation 10 as a starting
point.)
We again estimate the elasticity coefficient b by two-stage least squares. In the
first stage we use political leanings to instrument the change in mobility between
two points in time. In the second stage, we regress our dependent variable—either
the reproduction rate or the initial claims—on the fitted change in residential mo-
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bility. In this exercise, we cannot use the estimates of the reproduction rate in
Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020), since these start in the second half of March
for most regions. We rely instead on the estimates from Systrom, Vladek, and Krieger
(2020), which start earlier and are based on an adaptation of the estimation method
of Bettencourt and Ribeiro (2008). The middle and bottom panels of Figure 1 offer a
comparison of these alternative estimates of the reproduction rate when aggregated
at the national level.
The estimates of the reproduction rate from Systrom, Vladek, and Krieger (2020)
cover all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. The starting date for these
estimates varies by state, in line with the differential spread of the disease. The
earliest estimates are for February 19, 2020 for the state of Washington, whereas, at
the other end of the spectrum, estimates for Alaska, Idaho, and West Virginia only
start on March 8, 2020.17
The message from our new exercise is loud and clear. As shown in Table 2,
Column 1, there is a strong correlation between political leanings and the change
in mobility. In columns 2 and 3, the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the
instrumented mobility is 0 can be rejected at standard significance levels, despite the
fact that we only have 51 observations. The elasticity of initial jobless claims with
respect to mobility in column 3 of this table, at about 0.17, is remarkably close to the
analogous elasticity in column 3 of Table 1, which is approximately 0.15. This finding
indicates that the economic costs of changes in mobility are comparable, regardless
of whether the changes are driven by mandated or spontaneous measures. However,
it could still be the case that for comparable costs, the spontaneous measures could
have induced a bigger decline in the reproduction rate. Moving back to Table 1
for the panel regression instrumented with stay-at-home orders, Column 2 shows an
elasticity of the reproduction rate with respect to mobility of about -3.5. By contrast
the analogous estimate in Column 2 of Table 2 is about -2.3, which implies a lower
effectiveness of spontaneous measures in reducing the reproduction rate relative to
mandated measures.18
17 Given the later start of estimates for the reproduction rate, for Alaska, Idaho, and West Virginia we use a
shorter window of nine days when computing the changes in Equation 11.
18 For our comparison we used estimates based on different datasets for the mandated and spontaneous mea-
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In sum, we have produced evidence that, despite the fact that spontaneous mea-
sures at the onset of the pandemic drove the bulk of the reduction in mobility, they
were no less costly than mandated measures, even when controlling for their impact
on the reproduction rate. This result is an original contribution of our analysis.
While subsets of our results have also been documented by related analyses, the
value added from our study consists of comparing the effects of mandated social
distancing with the effects of spontaneous distancing, on both epidemiological and
economic indicators.
3 A Four-Group, Two Sector Integrated Model
In this section, we motivate and present our integrated assessment model for infec-
tious diseases. This model combines a deterministic compartmental SIRD model of
epidemiology with four population groups, and a two-sector economic growth model.
As we have seen above, epidemiological models attempt to map the complex trans-
mission interactions of infectious diseases in a population into a formal mathematical
structure that can describe the large scale dynamics. To integrate epidemiological
and economic models, we have to make assumptions about the interaction of the
spread of the disease with economic activity. In our framework, we allow for three
channels. First, if at least some of the individuals who have fallen ill from the
disease cannot work, the aggregate labor supply shrinks temporarily and reduces
economic activity. Second, social distancing to control the spread of the infectious
disease either prevents individuals from conducting their work altogether or limits
their productivity (e.g., by imposing inefficient home-office arrangements). Again,
the reduction in effective labor causes economic activity to fall and, if the social
distancing is implemented over a long time period, a decline in investment activity
may cushion the near-term fall in consumption but add persistence to the economic
repercussions. Third, in our two-sector economic growth model, it matters greatly for
sures, the datesets of Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020) and of Systrom, Vladek, and Krieger (2020), re-
spectively. We can also estimate the elasticity of the reproduction rate with respect to mobility for mandated
measures using the dataset of Systrom, Vladek, and Krieger (2020) and find an even more sizable elasticity of
about -5.1.
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economic activity how the health measures affect labor supply across across sectors.
We should stress from the start a key difference between our approach and leading
contributions, pioneered by Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020), that rede-
fine preferences to capture how agents reduce consumption or labor supply in view
of contagion risk when engaging in these activities. Instead of modifying prefer-
ences to account for the unobservable spontaneous precautionary behavior in social
interactions, we calibrate our integrated model with evidence on differential contact
rates implied by engaging in different activities, to gain insight on how the observed
reduction in contacts, proxied by mobility, can affect economic activity via supply
disruptions. By no means is this choice meant to downplay the importance of mod-
elling and investigating theoretically the roots of behavior driving the precautionary
reduction in consumption and labor. On the contrary, we see the two modelling
strategies as complementary lines of research.
In our approach, we treat variations in mobility from the data equally regardless
of whether they are driven by spontaneous decision or mandated measures. The
evidence in the previous section, showing that both types of changes in mobility
had comparable effects on the reproduction rate and unemployment, lends empirical
support to our choice.
Our approach nonetheless places demands on the epidemiological model. In par-
ticular, relative to the model presented in the previous section, we need to track
different population groups depending on their roles in the economy. This multi-
group model is described in the next section.
3.1 The Epidemiological Block of the Integrated Model: A
Four-Group SIRD Model
As a key bridge between epidemiology and economics, we expand the SIRD model
presented in Section 2.1 by splitting the population N in four groups. The size of
group j =∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is denoted by Nj with N1+N2+N3+N4 = N . The members
of each group are homogeneous and share specific socioeconomic characteristics. The
members of groups 1 and 2 are in the labor force and are employed in sectors 1 and
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2, respectively. The members of the third group, the young, attend school and do
not work. Similarly, the members of the last group, the old, do not work either.
Relative to the one-group model, another important innovation in our four-group
model is the possibility that at time T vac a highly effective vaccine becomes available.
For each of the four group of the population we now have susceptible, infective,
resolving, recovered (cured), deceased, as well as a subgroup of vaccinated, denoted,
respectively, Sj,t, Ij,t, Rj,t, Cj,t, Dj,t , Vj,t with Sj,t+Ij,t+Rj,t+Cj,t+Dj,t+Vj,t = Nj.
Notably, both the average number of contacts per person and the probability of
transmission can differ across groups, so that the effective contact rate transmission
can be group-dependent.19 We refer to βt as the matrix of effective contacts in the
multi-group SIRD model. The elements βj,k,t of βt are the group-dependent contact
rates which measure the probability that a susceptible person in group j meets an
infective person from group k and becomes infective.
As far as there is no vaccine, susceptible individuals remain susceptible until they
become infected. Once a vaccine becomes available at time T vac—assuming that the
vaccines is fully effective—the subpopulation of susceptibles shrinks as individuals
are vaccinated. We denote by ψj,t the vaccination rate for group j at time t. Note
that it is ψj,t = 0 for t < T
vac for all j.
The system of equations for the four-group SIRD model is given by:




βj,k,tIk,t/Nk − ψj,tSj,t, (12)




βj,k,tIk,t/Nk − γjIj,t, (13)
Rj,t+1 −Rj,t = γjIj,t − ϑRj,t, (14)
Cj,t+1 − Cj,t = (1−̟j)ϑRj,t, (15)
Dj,t+1 −Dj,t = ̟jϑRj,t, (16)
Vj,t+1 − Vj,t = ψj,tSj,t, (17)
with j =∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. We discuss the parameterization of the effective contact rates




3.2 The Macroeconomic Block of the Integrated Model: A
Two-Sector Model
Individuals live in identical households that pool consumption risk across the different
household members, i.e., the composition of each household reflects the relative group
sizes in the population. However, we do not allow labor to be substitutable across
sectors. Absent social distancing, all susceptible and recovered individuals work.
Infective individuals may or may not be symptomatic: we assume that symptomatic
individuals do not work. We describe the connection between the economic and the
epidemiological model in the next section.
Our model comprises two intermediate sectors, Sector 1 and Sector 2. Individuals
in Group 1 provide labor services inelastically to firms in Sector 1. Individuals in
Group 2 provide labor services inelastically to firms in Sector 2. Individuals in
groups 3 and 4, the young and the old, are not in the labor force. Final goods are
produced with inputs from the two intermediate sectors with a constant elasticity of
substitution function. These inputs are imperfect substitutes for each other.20 The
two sectors differ by their production structure. In Sector 1, labor inputs are subject
to a minimum scale requirement. This scale requirement is a simple way to capture
the specialized skills of different workers, all of which are necessary to produce a
certain product. Larger labor shortfalls make it more likely that production will
be impaired by the absence of essential members of a team. We abstract from
modeling the interaction of capital with the labor input in Sector 1. We have in
mind production structures in which capital cannot easily compensate for shortfalls
in the labor input. For example, if doctors and nurses do not show up for work, it
seems unlikely that adjustments could be made to compensate for their absence. By
contrast, with Sector 2, we are attempting to capture production processes in which
the utilization of capital services can be more easily adapted, and in which labor
20 Krueger, Uhlig, and Xie (2020) also bridge an epidemiological model and a two-sector economic model,
building on the setup of Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020). In the model of Krueger, Uhlig, and Xie
(2020), different contact rates distinguish each sector. Furthermore, labor is the only input into production and
labor mobility across sectors helps blunt the economic impact of the pandemic.
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inputs are more readily substitutable for capital services.
Households maximize consumption and supply two types of labor, l1,t and l2,t
inelastically. Households also rent capital services utkt−1 to firms in Sector 2, where
ut captures variable capacity utilization that can also be adjusted for those services.





θi log(ct+i − κct+i−1). (18)
Households choose streams of consumption, investment, capital and utilization to
maximize utility subject to the budget constraint










where the term −ν0
u1+νt
1+ν
captures costs from adjusting capital utilization. The pa-
rameter ν0 allows us to normalize utilization to 1 in the steady state, whereas the





captures costs of adjusting investment, with these costs governed by the parameter
ζ. Households’ utility maximization is also subject to the law of motion for capital,
given by
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + it, (20)
and to a threshold level of investment,
it ≥ φi, (21)
where φi denotes a fraction of steady-state investment. Notice that when φ = 0,
Equation 21 implies the irreversibility of capital.
Moving to the description of the production sector, firms in Sector 1 use labor l1,t
to produce the good v1,t and charge the price p1,t. The production function is given
by
v1,t = η (l1,t − χ) . (22)
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3.3 Integrating the Epidemiological and the Macroeconomic
Model
The dynamics of the epidemiological and the macroeconomic models are interwo-
ven. On the one hand, the virus and mitigation measures—both spontaneous and
mandated—directly reduce economic activity: Symptomatic sick individuals may
not work. The labor supply may also decline if healthy individuals decide not to
work either because of workplace closures or because of their own choosing to reduce
their exposure to the virus. Similar considerations can also precipitate a contraction
in consumption. On the other hand, individuals’ ability and willingness to engage
in economic activity has direct implications for the spread of the virus. People who,
for whichever reason, work from home or not at all have fewer relevant contacts that
could result in an infection. The lower risk of infection is reflected in the decline in
the effective contact rate βt.
3.3.1 Dynamics of the Effective Contact Rate
Similar to other recent contributions on the macroeconomics of epidemics, in our
setting βt is sensitive to economic conditions and choices.
21 However, rather than
positing a direct functional relationship between economic variables and the effective
contact rate βt, our functional form for βt is consistent with the key feature of
the “law of mass action” assumed in the SIRD and other popular epidemiological
models. Under this law, the rate at which infective and susceptible individuals meet
21 See for example, Alvarez, Argente, and Lippi (2020), Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020), and Kaplan,
Moll, and Violante (2020).
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is proportional to their spatial density. We specify a mapping from spatial density
to economic variables, which accounts for the fact that not all reductions in spatial
density translate necessarily into a reduction of economic activity.
Recall that βt is defined as the product of the matrix of average contacts qt and
the transmission risk µt. Epidemiologists have carefully studied people’s social con-
tact patterns to understand the spread of infectious diseases. Importantly, contacts
differ by location and age. The POLYMOD study, one influential study of social
contacts, allows to derive matrices for the contacts between the members of differ-
ent age groups in four location settings: home (h), school (s), work (w), and other
(o).22 The time-invariant matrix ql with l ∈ {h, s, w, o} informs about the number
of contacts that a typical member of each demographic group has with the members
of each demographic group. Absent contact restrictions, the average contact matrix
aggregated over locations satisfies
qt = q
h + qs + qw + qo. (25)
Spontaneous and mandatory restrictions reduce social contacts through lowering









where the row vector rlt denotes the reduction in the spatial marginal density of
each demographic group. Time-variation in rlt induces time-variation in the average
contact matrix aggregated over locations qt even if the underlying contact matrices
are constant. Equation 26 foreshadows our calibration assumption that contacts at
home between family members cannot be reduced by mitigation measures. Of course,
the economic costs can differ across types of restrictions.
While data on contact rates and contact restrictions are available, little is known
about the factors influencing the transmission risk µt of the coronavirus. Viruses
mutate and they can become more or less contagious. Appropriate hygiene, masks,
22 The POLYMOD study, discussed in Mossong et al. (2008), reports contact patterns for several European
countries.
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and keeping proper physical distance seem to lower the transmission risk according
to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention. The transmission also appears
to be higher indoors than outdoors; increased outside activity during the warmer
months of the year may thus lower temporarily the transmission risk. Absent direct
quantitative evidence how these factors affect the transmission risk, we shy away
from specifying a functional form that describes the evolution of the transmission
risk over time. Instead, we treat µt as an exogenous variable.
3.3.2 Disease Spread, Disease Management and the Labor Supply
A pandemic may cause economic costs and disruptions through different channels.
Our focus is on how infections and contact restrictions impair the labor supply—
a key driver of economic activity. Specifically, we link the evolution of the labor
supply explicitly to infections and contact restrictions using data on mobility and
the ability to work from home. Our modelling choice does not mean that we view
other channels, such as a drop in “social consumption” (restaurants and hospitality)
as unimportant. Rather, it reflects the difficulty to establish a data-oriented link
between these channel and the pandemic.23 We should nonetheless note that our
approach also accounts for a reduction in consumption triggered by changes in the
labor supply, wage income and investment.
Without the disease, the labor supply in each sector is
lj,t = Nj, (27)
for j ∈ [1, 2] for all t. As the disease starts spreading, we assume that sick and symp-
tomatic individuals that are in the resolving state, Rj,t, do not work. In addition,
the labor force of each sector is reduced by deaths. Hence, denoting with ι the share
23 In the case of consumption, note that social contact studies provide little detail on consumption-related
contacts. Even if we classify all “other contacts” as consumption-related, neither theory nor data provide clear
guidance for how reductions in consumption-related contacts map into reductions in consumption and thus
economic activity. For example, a wider use of technology (online transactions, delivery and pickup services) or
product substitution (food at home vs. food away from home) may imply little change in consumption expenses
even as consumers manage to reduce consumption-related contacts. The closing of providers of consumption
services to reduce consumption-related contacts mechanically implies a reduction in the consumption of services.
But such a decline in consumption could also be viewed as supply-driven and linked to a reduction in labor.
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of resolving individuals who are asymptomatic, the labor supply in sector j satisfies
lj,t = Nj −Dj,t − (1− ι)Rj,t, (28)
for j ∈ [1, 2].
We have already shown how spontaneous and mandatory restrictions reduce con-
tacts, see Equation (26). Consistent with our focus on potential supply disruptions
from the disease, we posit that contact restrictions directly relate to economic ac-
tivity only by affecting the supply of labor services. As defined earlier, rwj,t denotes
the share of individuals in group j, that stop going to the workplace per effects of
contact restrictions. Now, not all work restrictions imply a fall in labor services,
since some jobs can be carried out from home. Assuming that contact restrictions
apply to all individuals in a group regardless of their health status, then, the labor
supply in sector j is given by
lj,t = Nj−Dj,t−max
[












In Equation 29, the contraction in the supply of labor services (in addition to deaths)
is accounted for by three terms. A first term, max
[
rwj,t − υj, 0
]
(Nj −Dj,t), nets out
the services provided by individuals in group j with contact restrictions, where υj
is the share of individuals in group j who can continue working from home. The





(1− ι)Rj,t is the number of sick and symptomatic individuals in group j





is the number of individuals in group j who get sick and are symptomatic but are
not under restrictions.
3.3.3 The Special Case of a One-Sector Macroeconomic Model
We conclude noting how our four-group/two-sector model can be simplified and
made comparable with other models in the literature. Trivially, the four-group SIRD
model readily collapses to a three-group model when we impose that all the shares
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pertaining to Group 1 are zero, i.e., S1,t = I1,t = R1,t = C1,t = D1,t = N1 = 0.
For comparability with the literature, it is also useful to keep the non-working-age
population (Groups 3 and 4), separate from the others. By the same token, our two-
sector model collapses to a prototypical one-sector real business cycle model when
we impose that the quasi-share parameter ω in Equation 24 is one.
4 Calibration and Solution
In this section, we present our calibration, summarized in Table 3, distinguishing
parameters relevant for the SIRD model and for the two-sector economic model. We
then discuss our solution method.
4.1 The Parameters of the SIRD model
We take many of the parameters to calibrate the epidemiological model from the
work by Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020), the study on which we built our
econometric work in Section 2.2. Infectiousness resolves at the Poisson rate γj = 0.2
in all four groups, i.e., within five days. Individuals move into the recovering class
at the rate ϑ = 0.1 from which they either recover with probability 1 − ̟j = 0.99
or die with probability ̟j = 0.1. Hence, after 10 about days, an individual either is
cured or deceased. Again, we assume the probability of death to be identical across
groups.
To parameterize the effective contact rate we first use data derived from the
POLYMOD study to build contact matrices by age-group and location. We then
combine the information on contact matrices with estimates for the reproduction
number to obtain estimates for the transmission rate. The POLYMOD study, funded
by the European Union, aims to strengthen public health decision making in Europe
through the development, standardisation and application of mathematical, risk as-
sessment and economic models of infectious diseases. Mossong et al. (2008) offer a
detailed discussion. In particular, the POLYMOD study offers data on contacts by
age-group and location for a number of European countries.
Prem, Cook, and Jit (2017) and Prem et al. (2020) project the data from the
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POLYMOD study to a large set of countries including the United States. We aggre-
gate the contact data by location and age provided in Prem, Cook, and Jit (2017)
into three age groups (young, middle-aged, and old). The matrices are displayed in
Table 4. The young and the middle-aged have considerably more total contacts than
the old and most of their contacts are with members of their own age group. For
the young more than half of the contacts occur at school and for the middle-aged
about half of the contacts occur at work. Contacts in locations other than school,
work and home include contacts during commuting, shopping and leisure activities.
Other contacts account for an important fraction of total contacts only for the old.
We assume the same contact patterns for middle-aged individuals regardless of their
sector of employment.24
To obtain an estimate of the transmission risk we use the contact matrices and
estimates of the basic reproduction number. Note that in the multi-group SIRD




qt is the sum over the contact matrices by location. We set µt to match the empirical
value of the reproduction number given the contact patterns and the infection rate
γ. Initially, the transmission probability µ0 equals 0.023 which is consistent with an
initial value of 2 of the reproduction number absent restrictions on mobility.
It is worth reiterating that the calibration of our SIRD model is daily. In order
to link the results from the epidemiological model to the macroeconomic models, we
average the results of the epidemiological model across thirty-day intervals.
4.2 The Parameters of the Economic Model
The relative sizes of the four groups are informed by the employment to population
ratio, the age distribution of the U.S. population, and the employment share in the
core sector. We set the combined size of Group 1 and Group 2, N1 + N2, at about
0.6 (or 60 percent of the total population), in line with data from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) for the employment-to-population ratio. Group 3 (the young)
24 The contact patterns for the United States are qualitatively similar to those reported for other advanced
economies. The average of total contacts per individual for the United States is similar to the average for
Italy and somewhat above the average for Korea and the UK. The POLYMOD study implies significantly lower
contacts for Germany reflecting much lower contacts at schools and the workplace.
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accounts for about 25 percent of the population and Group 4 (the old) accounts for
about 15 percent of the population.
The individual group sizes N1 and N2 reflect the employment share of the group
of industries in the economy that we deem essential and that are reported in Table 5.
The data on value added come from the tables on GDP by Industry of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). The employment shares reflect hours worked by industry
in the Productivity Release of the BLS. The shares reported in the table are for 2018,
the latest year for which data are available at the time of writing. The total share
of employment for the industries listed in the table is about 38 percent. Identifying
the individuals working in the essential industries as the Group 1 individuals in the
SIRD model we set N1 = 0.6× 0.38 ≈ 0.23. Hence, Group 2 is of size N2 ≈ 0.37.
The total share of GDP for the industries listed in the table is about 27 percent.
We fix the quasi-share parameter ω so that the value added of Sector 1 in the steady
state is the same percent of total output in the model, i.e., denoting steady-state
variables by omitting the time subscript, p1v1
y1
= 0.27.
The unit of time for the economic model is set to 1 month. We set the discount
factor θ to 1− 4
100
/12, implying an annualized interest rate of 4 percent in the steady
state. The depreciation rate δ is set to 1
10
/12, implying an annual depreciation rate
of 10 percent. The parameters governing consumption habits κ is set to 0.6, in line
with estimates for medium-scale macro models such as Smets and Wouters (2007).
We set the parameter α governing the share of capital in the production function of
Sector 2 to 0.3. The elasticity of substitution between factor inputs is 1
3
, implying a
choice of ρ = 1
1− 1
3
as derived in the appendix. We set the parameter ν governing the
elasticity of capacity utilization to 0.01, as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005). The parameter φ is equal to 0, implying that investment, once installed as
capital, is irreversible. In line with the broad range in Altig et al. (2011) and the
literature, we set to 10 the parameter ζ, which governs the costs of adjustment for
investment.
We set χ, the minimum scale parameter for the production function of Sector
1, to 6
10
times l1, implying that
4
10
of the steady state labor input for sector 1 is
essential for production. The scaling parameter η is set to 10
4
, offsetting the reduction
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in productivity implied by our choice of the minimum-scale parameter in the steady
state. This choice for η leaves the steady state production level unchanged relative to
a case without a minimum scale (i.e., when χ is 0). The appendix discusses how our
calibration of the scale parameters allows the model to match the observed collapse in
economic activity when we feed into the model a series of labor supply shocks that
replicates the reduction in labor inputs implied by the increase in unemployment
from March through October 2020, relative to the unemployment level in February
2020.
4.3 Cross-model Parameters
In our model, the macroeconomic cost of inaction is driven by the reduction in the
labor supply caused by the inability of symptomatic infective individuals to work
until recovered. To calculate the reduction in labor supply, we need to rely on an
estimate of the asymptomatic infected individuals. A study of the passengers of
the Diamond Princess cruise ship provides useful guidance. As reported in Russell
et al. (2020), about half of the passengers that tested positive for the virus were
asymptomatic. The asymptomatic share was also found to be different by age group.
We use a 40 percent estimate that applies to passengers of working age, i.e. ι = 0.4.
Given that labor supply is exogenous in our economic model, the fall in labor supply
becomes more acute as the infective share increases.
When we study the effects of social distancing measures, we need to allow for the
possibility that a fraction of the individuals subject to lockdown measures may still
be able to work from home. To estimate the fraction of individuals who can do so, we
use the American Time Use Survey of the BLS. According to survey data for 2018,
the latest available at the time of writing, about 30 percent of American workers can
work from home. The survey also provides differential rates by industry. Mapping
the coarser industry categories onto our industry choices for Sector 1 as listed in
Table 5, we extrapolate that 15 percent of individuals in Group 1 can work from
home, compared to 40 percent of individuals in Group 2. Thus, we set υ1 = 0.15
and υ2 = 0.4.
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4.4 Solution Method
The solution method has three important characteristics: First, it allows for a solu-
tion of the SIRD model that is exact up to numerical precision; second, it conveys
the expected path of the labor supply in each group to the economic model as a set of
predetermined conditions, following the numerical approach detailed in the appendix
of Bodenstein, Guerrieri, and Gust (2013); and third, it resolves the complication of
the occasionally binding constraints, implied by capital irreversibility, with a regime
switching approach following Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015). The modular solution
approach has the advantage of allowing us to consider extensions of either module
without complicating the solution of the other.
5 Simulation Results
We are now ready to use our model. We carry out two main exercises. In a first
exercise (the next subsection), we show that labor supply disruption can go a long
way to explain a contraction in output similar to the one experienced by the United
States at the beginning of the pandemic. To this end, we calibrate our model using
mobility data and estimates of the share of workers that can work from home.
In our second exercise, we repeat the analysis replacing the estimates of mobility
with a lockdown, which we design drawing on the main lessons from our integrated
model. From our supply-side perspective, health measures can reduce economic
disruptions to the extent that they are successful in protecting workers in the core
sector from the infection externality when other workers and people circulate without
restrictions. For comparison, we also build a scenario with “inaction”, under which,
counterfactually, there is no social distancing at all. This is meant to highlight the
potentially large economic consequences of the disease when its spread is unmitigated
by any, spontaneous or mandatory, social distancing.
We emphasize from the start that our main goal is assessing the economic con-
sequences of potential supply disruptions from labor market shortages. Important
economic costs may stem from shifts in demand patterns, associated with large re-
allocation costs, in the presence of nominal, financial and other frictions. However, a
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shock of the size and nature of a pandemic raises a unique set of questions concerning
how the supply structure of an economy can continue to work when confronting an
abrupt reduction in the scale of production. This reduction is what our model is
designed to capture.
5.1 Labor Supply and Output Disruptions
In this first set of simulations, our model tracks data on the observed reduction in
mobility from the beginning of March through the end of October 2020, together
with labor market and occupational data. Our goal is to bring our integrated model
to bear on the estimated path of the reproduction rate over the same period.
Figure 2 shows an abrupt decline in the workplace mobility measure from Google
LLC (2020) at the onset of the pandemic. Over the second half of March, workplace
mobility was cut in half. Thereafter, over April and May, workplace mobility partially
bounced back but remained 30 percent below pre-pandemic levels through the end of
October. The figure also shows that the decline in workplace mobility was mirrored
by an increase in the residential mobility measure from Google LLC (2020)—basically
proxying for the time spent at home.
For our analysis, we need to map the decline in mobility into a reduction in
contacts through the workplace and a reduction in labor inputs. Accordingly, we
need to take a stand on the share of workers who continued to work from home. As
discussed in the calibration section, estimates based on the BLS American Time Use
Survey point to about 30 percent of the work force being able to continue working
from home. As a baseline, we can treat any reduction in mobility in excess of this
30 percent mark as a reduction in labor inputs. For instance, at the peak of 50
percent reduction in workplace contacts, we will assume that the fall in labor input
amounts to 50-30=20 percentage points. This approach is backed by estimates of
office occupancy rates based on entry card swipes, which also show a precipitous
decline in the second half of March 2020 to de minimis levels, followed by only a
modest rebound in occupancy rates through the end of October 2020. Overall, the
evidence suggests that a large share of workers who could switch to working from
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home, did so.25
In our simulations, we impose that the path of the reproduction rate implied
by our simulations is close to realistic estimates of this rate.26 The top panel of
Figure 3 shows again the estimate of the reproduction rate from Fernández-Villaverde
and Jones (2020), the solid black line, matched by construction in our simulation.
This panel also shows the reproduction rate implied by our epidemiological model,
incorporating the changes in mobility discussed above but without overriding the
probability of transmission needed to match the estimates of Fernández-Villaverde
and Jones (2020). The panel clarifies that the mobility changes go a long way in
capturing the empirically relevant reproduction rate.
We stress that our model-implied path for the reproduction rate includes not
only the reduction in workplace contacts, but also a reduction in non-work activi-
ties/contacts for all population groups (whether or not in the work force), which we
assume to be of the same magnitude as the reduction in work contacts. This as-
sumption is buttressed by the reduction in non-work mobility measures indicative of
social distancing across different population groups. Looking back to Figure 2, note
that the reduction of mobility towards retail outlets and transit hubs is strikingly
close to the reduction in mobility towards workplaces. Moreover, in our simulations,
we set school contacts to 0 from the beginning of April to the beginning of Au-
gust, in line with the widespread school closures in the United States during this
period. After August, we allow for an increase in school contacts, but only by half
the pre-COVID-19 levels, to account for a partial re-opening of schools across the
country.
The paths for the reproduction rate that our model generates based on this
stylized set of assumptions is remarkably close to estimates based on deaths from
COVID-19. The estimated path does dip below the model-implied path for most of
the period (apart from a window in July and August). It is worth reiterating here
25 For instance see coverage of office occupancy rates based on Kastle card swipes in the Wall Street Journal
“Companies Tiptoeing Back to the Office Encounter Legal Minefield” published on November 16, 2020.
26 As explained in the calibration section, we set the probability of transmission given contact, µt, to match the
empirical value of the reproduction number given the contact patterns and the infection rate, γ. This is important:
if the model missed in this dimension, an excessively high reproduction rate would lead to a significant share of
infected symptomatic workers, that would counterfactually amplify the drop in the labor input.
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that mobility and contacts, however important, are not the only factors affecting
the spread of the disease. The rate of disease transmission may fall if people wear
masks (a precaution that has become more prevalent over time), and/or in response
to seasonal factors. With good weather, people may spend more time outside, except
when very high temperatures push them back inside, in air-conditioned spaces.
The top two panels of Figure 4 show the model-implied progression of the infec-
tion at the quarterly frequency. The number of infected individuals reaches a peak
in the second quarter. Even at this peak, however, the reduction in labor supply
attributable to the inability to work of symptomatic infected individuals was too
small to have a significant effect on the overall labor supply.27
The economic scenarios generated by our model are shown in the bottom four
panels of Figure 4, contrasting the predictions of our one- and the two-sector version
of the model. While both models have qualitatively similar implications for the
course of economic activity, there is a marked quantitative difference. In the one-
sector model, the output collapse in the second quarter is about 6 percent. In our
two sector model, the collapse is one fourth larger, 8 percent. Both models predict
large contractions—a significant share of the observed decline in GDP in the United
States in the second quarter of 2020 (which clearly reflects a number of other forces).
The difference between the one- and the two-sector models is also apparent in the
paths of utilization, consumption and investment.
What explains these differences is the fact that, in our two-sector version of the
model, the consequences of a fall in the labor inputs in the essential sector are
amplified by the non-monotonic feature of the production function—the minimum
scale assumption implies a significant fall in overall labor productivity. Because of
this specific feature of the model, the distribution of labor supply cuts across sectors
is of first-order importance. In our simulations, we take the conservative approach
of adjusting the sectoral labor cuts so to keep the reduction in value added in the
second quarter of 2020 balanced across sectors, as shown in Figure 5. The rationale
for this assumption is that the share of work from home is different across the two
27 As shown in the figure, the number of deaths plateaus at 300,000 after 6 quarters from the start of the sample
period. This is because in our simulations the reproduction rate becomes constant at the level estimated for the
end of October, which was close to 1.
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sectors. If we applied the mobility data homogeneously across sectors, the reduction
in labor inputs would be heavily skewed toward the essential sector. By keeping the
reduction in value added balanced across the two sectors, our distribution of labor
cuts actually minimizes the drop in aggregate output—as a way to reduce the risk
of overstating the incidence of supply shortages in disrupting economic activity.
The main takeaway is that supply disruptions in the wake of a pandemic could
play a non-negligible role in the collapse in GDP—even if these are not amplified by
a drop in the productivity of the core-sector (as shown by our one-sector model); and
even when the spread of the disease remains contained (possibly because of social
distancing) and the economic costs of social distancing are mitigated by a widespread
switch to working from home. Larger supply disruptions may of course result from
a recrudescence of the disease motivating widespread and stricter lockdowns—which
would also increase the distance between the one- and the two-sector model.28
5.2 The Effects of Mandated Social Distancing
In this section, we discuss how the tradeoffs between health and economic outcomes
can be improved by adopting mandated social distancing measures that recognize
the need to protect the core sector of the economy. In simulations that follow,
changes in the reproduction rate (from the initial level of 2) come about exclusively
from the reduction in contacts implied by mandated social distancing measures. For
comparison, we also bring forward a scenario under a constant reproduction rate,
i.e., conditional on no social distancing. This scenario will be labeled “inaction.”
We note that the inaction scenario arguably weighed on policymakers’ perception
of the disease in March 2020 (see Ferguson et al. (2020)). Indeed, in the absence
of a clear understanding of the factors that could influence the transmission of the
disease, early debates were sometimes conducted under the assumption that, absent
policy intervention, the reproduction rate would stay constant at its initial level.
It is worth stressing that we intentionally steer away from “optimal policy” anal-
28 The main focus of our exercise is on labor supply disruptions and its effects on overall productivity. As the
model misses in other dimensions of the current crisis, such as omitting shifts in the composition of demand, in
our simulation economic activity tends to rebound more quickly than observed.
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ysis, as it would require a richer model as well as taking a stand on such parameters
as the value of human lives. However, our analysis draws on key principles that
are also building blocks in optimal policy exercises. Specifically, we consider policy
measures that are meant to internalize the infection externality from individual in-
teractions, not efficiently accounted for by optimizing individuals on their own (see,
e.g., Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020)).
5.2.1 A Baseline Social-distancing Configuration
To minimize the supply disruption of a lockdown, the health measures we consider in
our experiment target first and foremost workers who are able to continue supplying
their labor services from home. In line with the American Time Use Survey, con-
ducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the share of the labor force that can work
from home is 15 percent of workers in Group 1 (the group that supplies labor to the
core sector), and 40 percent of workers in Group 2 (the group that supplies labor to
the other sector). Accounting for the sizes of Group 1 and Group 2, combined, this
boils down to subject about 30 percent of the labor force to a complete lockdown.
A second set of restrictive measures are then targeted to reduce contacts between
core-sector workers who cannot provide their services from home, and the general
population. Consistently, we extend our health measures to individuals not in the
labor force, those in Group 3 and Group 4, up to restricting 30 percent of group
members, the same proportion used for the working population. With a lockdown
imposed on 1/3 of the total population, keeping the reproduction rate unchanged for
the population not subject to these measures, lifting the restrictions after 12 months
would lead to a resurgence of the pandemic, but one that, due to the building up of
herd immunity at a controlled pace, would spread more slowly.
The health consequences of the lockdown policy just described are illustrated
by the top two panels of Figure 6. The policy successfully flattens the infection
curve: the peak of the infection share of recovering individuals drops from about 8
percent to about 3 percent—admittedly still high relative to the capacity constraint
of healthcare systems, even when taking account of the fact that not all infected
individuals experience symptoms. A notable result is that the health outcomes of
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individuals are similar in Group 1 and 2, despite the fact that workers in the Group
1 continue working “on the road” in higher proportion than workers in Group 2.
The near-equalization of infection rates results from the way our lockdown measures
internalize the infection externality—the higher degree of social distancing in Group
2 and a high share of population under a lockdown helps shield individuals in Group
1.
Panels 5 through 8 of the figure contrast the economic consequences of mandated
social distancing with a counterfactual scenario of “inaction.” The reason to call
attention to this counterfactual scenario is that it allows to highlight the potentially
high upfront economic costs of the rapid peak in the disease due to labor supply
disruptions from (i) the inability of the symptomatic ill to continue working (in the
aggregate this may become relevant when the disease spreads at high rates); and
(ii) the reduction in labor supply due to deaths of individuals in the labor force.
In our work, we further stress the indirect, potentially significant costs from supply
constraints on the economy that follows a large contraction of the core sector.
Comparing these scenarios, the importance of smoothing out the peak of the
infection curve is apparent. Under our mandated social distancing baseline, the
peak contraction in output is less than one half relative to the case of inaction. Key
to this result is that, while the social distancing policy compresses the trough for
value added similarly in both sectors, Sector 1 remains more active relative to the
scenario without intervention.
Another notable result in the figure is that, independently of mandated social
distancing measures, the pandemic has persistent economic consequences. These
reflect both the death toll on the size of labor force, and the fact that a smaller
labor force leads to a persistent reduction in the productivity of the essential sector,
weighing on final output, consumption, and investment—not only in the aggregate
but also in per capita terms.
In sum, the key takeaway from our exercise is that lockdowns can be structured
to reduce the risks of large supply disruption in the economy. In particular, lockdown
policies should be stricter on workers in the non-core sector and non-active popu-
lation, and targeted specifically at workers who could reasonably keep performing
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their occupational tasks from home. Such combination of measures is successful to
the extent that they address the infection externality where it has more economic
bite, i.e., they keep the infection rate among the workers in core industries low.
5.3 Waiting for a Vaccine
The rest of this section uses the model to address the costs of a long lockdown put
in place in view of the availability of a vaccine, including some sensitvity analysis
motivated by the considerable uncertainty surrounding the parameters of the model.
The prospects of a vaccine in the non-distant future from the eruption of the pan-
demic raise the benefits of investing in social distancing, keeping contagion rates to a
level that can be effectively dealt with by the national health system until the immu-
nization programs can be rolled out. The lockdown measures studied in the previous
sections do not fully qualify: they smooth out the infection curve considerably, but
do not go insofar as preventing persistent hikes in the share of infected/recovering
individuals—which in all likelihood remains well above the response capacity of the
health care system. We thus turn our attention to mandated measures extended and
modified to keep the share of infected individuals low enough to avoid overtaxing the
health care system.
Specifically, we target our lockdown to keep the share of recovering individuals
in the population below 1 percent until a vaccine becomes available, set to 9 months
after the onset of the pandemic.29 At that point, the immunization campaign starts.
We assume that the vaccine is perfectly protective and that 10 percent of the popu-
lation is inoculated each month.
In the logic of our model, the cost of containing the share of the infected popula-
tion can be significantly reduced by extending the lockdown on non-working popula-
tion (groups 3 and 4) and by imposing measures that reduce non-work contacts more
aggressively. Relative to our baseline example discussed in Section 5.2.1, we increase
the share of the population under lockdown in groups 3 and 4 from 30 percent to 40
percent—and posit that non-work contacts can be reduced in this greater proportion
29 We use the 1 percent share for illustrative purposes. Alternatively one could target the peak incidence of
the disease explicitly to the capacity of the health care sector as in Moghadas et al. (2020).
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for all groups. Results are shown in Figure 7, whereas the lockdown measures are
relaxed after 12 months, as immunity is then built with immunization. Provided that
all the measures remain effective over this long time span, the results in the figure
suggest that well-structured health interventions are in principle able to reduce both
the spread of the disease and the economic consequences.
In our baseline, the assessment of the economic costs of a strict lockdown waiting
for a vaccine is arguably overly optimistic. Our model abstracts from many factors
that can amplify the crisis via demand and income disruptions. But even keeping
focus exclusively on labor supply disruptions, the assessment crucially depends on
both the degree of effectiveness of (and compliance in) a lockdown, and the charac-
teristics of the COVID-19 virus. We investigate robustness in these two dimensions
running two exercises below. In each of these two exercises, we maintain the basic
design features of our baseline simulation in Figure 7. Namely, we still target a
population share of recovering individuals below 1 percent until the arrival of the
vaccine 9 months after the onset of the pandemic, and assume the same monthly
rate of vaccination of 10 percent.
So far, we have assumed that the social distancing measures can bring the contact
rates to 0. As robustness, we follow Alvarez, Argente, and Lippi (2020), who consider
a lower effectiveness of social distancing, only reducing contacts by 80 percent. Under
this assumption, with our lockdown measures in place, the peak of the population
share of recovering individuals would rise from just under 1 percent, to about 2
percent. A target below 1 percent would then require a tighter lockdown. For
instance, the target could be met by raising the share of individuals in groups 1 and
2 under lockdown, to about 20 and 50 percent, respectively—while also extending
the lockdown to 40 percent of the nonworking population for 12 months.30 With
these stricter measures in place, however, the economy would experience a drop in
output of about 8 percent for the duration of the wait for a vaccine.31
The cost of waiting for a vaccine would also be higher with an increase in the
probability of transmission due to a virus mutation. The new variant of the COVID-
30 We still constrain the share of individuals under lockdown in Group 3 to match the share for groups 1 and
2 combined.
31 See Figure A.3 in the appendix.
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19 virus identified in the United Kingdom at the end of 2020 is estimated to be
up to 70 percent more transmissible. Mapping this estimate into a change in the
probability of transmission given contacts, would imply a rise in the reproduction
rate from 2 to 3.3. With our baseline lockdown in place, the higher reproduction rate
would be sufficient to raise the share of recovering individuals to about 8 percent,
nearly as high as in a scenario of inaction. The goal of keeping this share below 1
percent in this case would require more drastic measures. For instance, the goal could
be achieved by placing under lockdown 40 and 90 percent of individuals in Group
1 and Group 2, respectively, and about 80 percent of individuals outside the labor
force. Furthermore, the lockdown would have to be extended for a longer period,
15 months, since a greater share of the population would have to be vaccinated to
achieve herd immunity. The economic consequences would be dire. According to our
model, the reduction in output would be as large as 50 percent before herd immunity
is reached and the lockdown is lifted. The contraction in investment would be so
large to cause the capital irreversibility constraint to bind—in turn amplifying the
contraction in consumption.32
6 Conclusion
A precipitous decline in employment brought about by the spread of an infectious
disease can have outsize economic costs if it ends up compromising linkages in the
production structure that are critical for the working of the economy as a whole.
We study the aggregate effects of supply disruptions potentially brought about by a
disease, specifying a two-sector model featuring a set of industries that produce core
inputs used by all the other industries. Core inputs are both poorly substitutable
with other inputs, and produced subject to a minimum scale of production.
Our integrated assessment framework suggests that the way an unchecked spread
of a pandemic can damage the economy is through labor drawdowns in core indus-
tries that could undermine efficient production in other sectors and, thus, aggregate
economic activity. This is an economic argument for social distancing, distinct from
32 See Figure A.4 in the appendix.
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the argument stressing the need to reduce the loss of human life resulting from
congestion overwhelming hospitals and health care systems. Simulations of our in-
tegrated assessment model suggest that even moderate mandated social distancing
may actually improve economic outcomes.
In our framework, the direct economic cost of the disease stems from the in-
ability of symptomatic infected individuals to continue working and the drop in
labor services due to spontaneous or mandated social distancing. Additional indi-
rect costs come from the constraint that malfunctioning core industries may place on
other industries via input-output linkages. Social distancing measures modulated to
shield essential economic linkages can buffet the fall in aggregate economic activity
effectively and without compromising the primary goal of flattening the infection
curve. The experiments we consider in this paper consist of applying social distanc-
ing measures proportionally more to the non-working-age population, and workers
in non-core industries and to occupations that involve tasks that can be performed
from home. These measures work through a key epidemiological externality that
ends up protecting workers in the core industries.
Calibrated with mobility data and estimates of the incidence of work-from-home,
our model comes close to matching the dynamic evolution of COVID-19 in the United
States through the summer of 2020. The spread of the disease, while pervasive, was
substantially less dramatic than suggested by some early epidemiological studies,
which underestimated the mitigating effects of the widespread adoption of both spon-
taneous and mandated social distancing on the reproduction rate. We investigate
empirically the epidemiological benefits and economic costs of social distancing at the
onset of the pandemic. We derive our empirical framework from the standard model,
proxying contacts using Google mobility data, and instrumenting mobility with ei-
ther the stay-at-home orders issued by individual U.S. states, or political leanings by
state. Our results suggest that, at the margin, changes in mobility through the first
quarters of 2020 in the United States had significant effects on both reproduction
rates and initial jobless claims. Strikingly, spontaneous social distancing was no less
costly than stay-at-home orders.
This paper was first drafted at the very beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic,
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conditional on early epidemiological scenarios of a rapid spread of the disease. Ex
post, the rate of contagion, while high, was not as dramatic and initially feared. Sup-
ply disruptions did not emerge as a systemic binding constraint. By no means does
this observation downplay the need to model carefully the resilience of production
network and analyze its vulnerabilities. While supply chains remained remarkably
resilient in 2020, the sharp and sudden drop in demand and the temporary suspen-
sion in the supply of services (e.g., in the healthcare sector) may have hidden the
potential difficulties in producing core services when there are not enough workers
to meet the minimum scale of production.
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Table 1: The Effects of Stay-at-Home Orders
(1) (2) (3)
Res. Mobility Reproduction Rate Init. Unemp Claims
2sls 1st step 2sls 2nd step 2sls 2nd step
Stay-at-home orders 1.850∗∗
(0.000)
Residential mobility index -3.502∗ 0.153∗∗
(0.010) (0.000)
r2 0.918 0.153 0.610
N 1204 1204 1204
p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
All the regressions are run with data at the weekly frequency and include state and month fixed effects. A state-
by-state dummy that takes a value of 1 if a stay-at-home order is in force and zero otherwise is the instrument for
the Google residential mobility index in the 2-stage-least-squares regressions in columns (2) and (3). The results
in column (2) are based on the reproduction rate from the dataset of Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020).
Table 2: The Effects of Spontaneous Social Distancing
(1) (2) (3)
% Change Res. Mobility % Change R PPt. Change Init. Claims
2sls 1st step 2sls 2nd step 2sls 2nd step
% Republican Votes in 2016 -0.189∗∗
(0.000)
PPt. Change Res. Mobility -2.268+ 0.168∗∗
(0.099) (0.003)
r2 0.607 0.0439 0.140
N 51 51 51
p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Political leanings, as measured by the share of votes for the Republican presidential candidate in the 2016 election
are the instrument for the Google residential mobility index in the 2-stage-least-squares regressions in columns
(2) and (3). The results in column (2) are based are based on the reproduction rate from the Rt.Live dataset of
Systrom, Vladek, and Krieger (2020). These regressions focus on the two-week period prior to the enactment of
any state-level stay-at-home orders.
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Table 3: Parameters for the Integrated Assessment Model
Parameter Used to Determine Parameter Used to Determine
µ0 = 0.023 initial transmission probability (daily) γ = 0.2 resolution rate (daily)
ϑ = 0.1 recovery rate ̟ = 0.01 death rate (daily)
ι = 0.40 share of symptomatic infectives ψ = 0 vaccination rate
N1 = 0.23 size Group 1 N2 = 0.37 size Group 2
N3 = 0.25 size Group 3 N4 = 0.15 size Group 4
υ1 = 0.15 share working from home Sector/Group 1 υ2 = 0.40 share working from home Sector/Group 2
θ = 1− 4
100
/12 discount factor (monthly) δ = 1
10
/12 capital depreciation rate (monthly)
κ = 0.6 habit persistence ν = 0.001 elasticity capacity utilization
φ = 0 degree of capital reversibility 1− ω = 0.27 quasi-share value added Sector 1
η = 10
4
scaling parameter Sector 1 χ = 6
10
N1 minimum scale Sector 1
ρ = 1
1−1/3 substitution elasticity Sectors 1 and 2 α = 0.3 share capital in production Sector 2
ζ = 10 investment adjustment cost
Note: This table summarizes the parameterization of the baseline integrated assessment model.
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Table 4: Contacts by Age and Location












































total contacts (without reductions):










Note: Contacts by age—ordered as young (0-19), middle-aged (20-64), and old (65+) —were obtained by aggre-
gation over more detailed data provided in Prem, Cook, and Jit (2017) and Prem et al. (2020). We present the
contacts for middle-aged working individuals not disaggregated by sectors
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Table 5: The Core Sector: Share of GDP and of Employment
Line Sector Value Added,$ bn. Percent of GDP Percent of Employment
3 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 166.5 0.81 2.65
10 Utilities 325.9 1.58 0.52
26 Food and beverage and tobacco products 268.9 1.31 1.86
31 Petroleum and coal products 172.2 0.84 0.12
37 Food and beverage stores 156.4 0.76 2.2
40 Transportation and warehousing 658.1 3.2 5.27
76 Health care and social assistance 1536.9 7.47 8.66
91 Federal government, general services 729.0 3.54 0.88
96 State government, general services 1600.5 7.78 15.38
Total 5614.4 27.29 37.56
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP by Industry, and Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Productivity Release.
48
Figure 1: Stay-at-Home Orders, Mobility, COVID19 Death and Infection Rates — 7-Day Moving
Average
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COVID-19 Deaths, Confirmed Cases, and Residential Mobility
Time at home (% change from year start, left scale)
Infection rate (per 100,000, left scale)
Death rate (per 100,000, right scale)
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Running Reproduction Rate, Based on Death Rates
Median start of stay at home order
First stay at home order
Last stay at home order
Median end of at home order
United States
Max and Min across states
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct






Running Reproduction Rate, Based on Confirmed Cases
United States
Max and Min across states
Note: The vertical lines denoting key dates are repeated in each panel. Sources: The data for death rates and
confirmed cases are from JHU CSSE (2020). The data on stay-at-home orders are from Raifman et al. (2020).
The residential mobility data are from Google LLC (2020). The estimates of the reproduction rate based on
deaths are from Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020). The estimates of the reproduction rate based on
confirmed cases are from Systrom, Vladek, and Krieger (2020).
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Figure 2: Workplace and Residential Mobility—7-Day Moving Average
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Maximum across all states
National Average
Minimum across all states
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Note: The dips in workplace mobility at the end of May, beginning of July and end of September correspond to
national holidays. Their effects are prolonged by the moving average.
Source: Google LLC (2020).
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Figure 3: Dynamics in the SIRD Model
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Note: The paths shown are aggregates for the total population. The observed reproduction rate is used in the
model simulations and to back out the paths in the bottom three panels. The model-implied paths are generated
varying the number of contacts in line with the residential mobility measure from Google LLC (2020) and school
closures but keeping the probability of contagion given contacts unchanged from its baseline value. The paths
in the top panel are daily. All other panels show monthly averages of daily series.
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Figure 4: Aggregate Economic Consequences of COVID-19: Comparing One-Sector and Two-
Sector Models
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Figure 5: Economic Consequences of COVID-19: Sectoral Detail for the Two-Sector Model






























































3. Labor, Sector 1

























4. Labor, Sector 2


























5. Value Added, Sector 1


























6. Value Added, Sector 2
Note: This figure provides additional sectoral details for the two-sector model, complementing the paths for
aggregate variables shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 6: Comparing the Aggregate Economic Consequences of COVID-19 with and Without
Social Distancing: A Two-Sector Approach
















































3. Group-1 Deceased, cumulative














4. Group-2 Deceased, cumulative























5. Output, per capita
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8. Investment, per capita
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Figure 7: Waiting for a Vaccine
















































3. Group-1 Deceased, cumulative














4. Group-2 Deceased, cumulative























5. Output, per capita
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A Additional Details for the Two-Sector Model
This appendix derives the equilibrium conditions for the two-sector model and the
steady-state condition. Finally, it also shows the derivation of the elasticity of sub-







i [log(ct+i − κct+i−1)
+λc,t+i
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+λk,t+i (−kt+i + (1− δ)kt+i−1 + it+i) + λi,t+i (it − φi
ss)] .



































= λk,t + λi,t+i, (32)
Etλc,t+1rk,t+1ut+1 − λk,t + β(1− δ)Etλk,t+1 = 0, (33)




and the complementary slackness condition
λi,t+i (it − φi
ss) = 0. (36)





























Firms in Sector 2 solve this cost-minimization problem




















Notice that firms choose utkt−1 as if it were a single input, representing capital
services. The first-order conditions for this problem are:




























α−1 l1−α2,t = 0.














































































































And from the budget constraint we can derive that the goods market must clear










The 14 equations above allow us to determine 14 variables yt, v1,t, v2,t, ct, it, kt, ut,
λc,t, λi,t, λk,t, p1,t, w1,t, w2,t, rk,t, with l1,t and l2,t determined by exogenous processes.
A.2 Steady-State Conditions
Set ut = 1 and later set ν0 to support this choice. Notice that the investment
constraint must be slack in the steady state, so
λi = 0. (44)
Using
λc,t = λk,t + λi,t,
and λc,trk,t − λk,t + θ(1− δ)Etλi,t+1 = 0, we can see that












and combining it with rk = 1 − θ(1 − δ), we can use a numerical solver to get k,
given l1 and l2.
Knowing k, and with
v1 = η(l1 − χ), (47)

















From kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + it, we have that
i = δk (49)
Using λc,trk,tkt−1 = λc,tν0u
ν
t , find the value of ν0 that ensures u = 1. Accordingly
ν0 = rkk (50)
And using the resource constraint, we can solve for c




































A.3 Deriving the Elasticity of Substitution for the Produc-

































































































































Therefore to hit a destired elasticity set ρ as







B Calibration of the Minimum-Scale Parameter
and Additional Sensitivity Analysis
To calibrate the minimum-scale parameter for the production function of Sector 1 in
the two-sector model, see Equation 22, we adopt the following strategy. We feed into
the model a path of labor supply shocks that meets two restrictions: 1) it balances
the decline in value added across sectors and 2) it brings about a reduction in labor
inputs in line with the increase in the unemployment rate relative to the 3.5 percent
mark observed in February, 2020. We then set the minimum scale parameter to match
a 12 percent decline in GDP in the the second quarter of 2020. We calculated this
decline relative to the consensus level of GDP in the Blue Chip forecasts published
in January 2020, before private forecasters entertained the possibility of a pandemic.
The resulting calibration choice for the parameter χ is 6
10
times the steady state value
for the labor input of Sector 1.
Figure A.1 compares one- and two-sector models that match the observed increase
in unemployment from March through October 2020 relative to the level in February
2020. After October 2020, the labor supply shocks follow an auto-regressive process
with a coefficent of 0.95. The figure shows sizable differences between the economic
collapse that can be matched with our two-sector model and the smaller economic
decline implied by the special case of a one-sector model. We conclude that our
two-sector model is a more appropriate choice to study the economic consequences
of the COVID-19 pandemic.
B.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Figure A.2 offers sensitivity analysis pertaining to the comparison on the economic
effects of the spread of COVID-19 without any social distancing measures. We
compare the economic effects using one- and two-sector models. Figure A.2 considers
sensitivity to a range of values of the initial reproduction rate. It shows that the
differences between the one- and two-sector models persist as long as the reproduction
rate does not drop below 1.2, a level that would also curtail the spread of the disease.
Figures A.3 and A.4 complement the discussion of the cost of waiting for a vaccine
in Section 5.3. They pertain, respectively, to sensitivity analysis to the effectiveness of
the lockdown and to the probability of transmission of the disease for given contacts.
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Figure A.1: Using the Two-Sector Model to Match the Observed Increase in the Unemployment
Rate Relative to February 2020





























































































5. Value Added, Sector 1

























6. Value Added, Sector 2
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Figure A.2: Comparing the Aggregate Economic Consequences of COVID-19 Without Social
Distancing in One- and Two-Sector Models: Sensitivity to the Reproduction Rate



































Initial R0 and Cumulative Output Loss
Two-Sector Model
One-Sector Model


































Initial R0 and Cumulative Output Loss: A Lower Minimum Scale For Sector 1
Note: We assume that no social distancing measures are taken to reduce the spread of the disease. The output
loss stems from the reduction in labor supply from symptomatic infected individuals. The figure shows the
cumulative output loss over six months alternatively based on one- and two-sector models for different values of
the reproduction rate (set to 2 in our baseline). The top panel keeps all other parameters at their baseline values.
For the bottom panel, we have increased the minimum scale parameter for Sector 1, χ, to 8
10
of the steady state
labor input, as opposed to 6
10
in the baseline calibration.
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Figure A.3: Waiting for a Vaccine: A Lower Effectiveness of the Lockdown at Reducing Contact
Rates
















































3. Group-1 Deceased, cumulative














4. Group-2 Deceased, cumulative






















5. Output, per capita
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Figure A.4: Waiting for a Vaccine: A 70 Percent Increase in the Transmissibility of the Virus

















































3. Group-1 Deceased, cumulative















4. Group-2 Deceased, cumulative






















5. Output, per capita
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